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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ZONA LARSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
BREITLING BROTHERS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12125

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff for damages for
personal injuries that arose out of a truck auto collision that occurred on the 6th day of August, 1968,
at or near the intersection of 3650 South and 3200
West in Salt Lake County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The action was tried to a jury on the issues of
the negligence of the defendant and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff and a jury verdict was
rendered in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiff.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the jury verdict and
judgment entered thereon, and the judgment of this
Court, that the defendant was negligent as a matter
of law and that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident in question. That failing,
plaintiff seeks a new trial on all issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Zona Larsen, (plaintiff and appellant) resides
at 573 Wall Street, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and was
sixty three years of age on the date that the accident
occurred. She had driven a car earlier in her life but
had not possessed a driver's license for a number of
years and prior to the accident in question had obtained a learner's permit, had taken drivers training
and on the day of the accident, (August 6, 1968) was
operating a motor vehicle accompanied by a neighbor,
Mrs. Phyllis B. Stetich.
On the morning in question, Mrs. Larsen had
left her home accompanied by Mrs. Stetich and they
had gone to the Sutherland Lumber Company on Redwood Road, and thence, journeyed South on Redwood
Road to 3500 South Street and there turned West to
3200 West where she made a left turn and was proceeding South on 3200 West. (R. 189) She was on
her way to visit a daughter who resided on American
Drive which is in Granger, Utah.
At the time Mrs. Larsen made her left turn on
3200 West she was aware that a dump truck had also
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made a left turn behind her and she was generally
aware of the presence of the dump truck as both vehicles proceeded South on 3600 West. ( R. 190) As
Mrs. Larsen approached the intersection of 3650
South she intended to make a left turn to proceed
East. Approximately 100 feet back of the intersection she put on her left turn directional indicator and
slowed down by releasing her foot from the accelerator. (R. 192). Her speed and that of the truck just
before she started to slow down was aproximately 25
to 27 miles per hour. (R. 192). Before Mrs. Larsen
reached the intersection her vehicle was struck by the
dump truck and she sustained the injuries complained of in this action.
Mrs. Phyllis Ste tich is a neighbor of Mrs. Lar.;.
sen and was riding with her as a passenger in the
front seat of the automobile. She testified to the same
essential facts as did Mrs. Larsen. She stated that
they did stop for a semaphore light at the intersection
of 35th South and 3200 West and when the light turned green they made a left turn and proceeded South
on 3200 West toward the intersection of 3650 South
where the impact occurred.
Mrs. Stetich had ridden with Mrs. Larsen on
several occasions and in her opinion she had progressed and was a good driver. ( R. 163).
In her judgment they were traveling at approximately 20 to 25 miles an hour as they proceeded South
on 3200 West. ( R. 165). 3200 West is a two lane road
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with a dirt shoulder on each side and a rather deep
ditch on the West side (R. 166). As the vehicle approached the intersection Mrs. Stetich observed that
Mrs. Larsen put on her left turn signal and slowed
down somewhat and was then struck in the rear. ( R.
167). Mrs. Stetich observed nothing unusual in the
manner that Mrs. Larsen drove the vehicle or aproached the turn. ( R. 168) .
The accident was investigated by Deputy Sheriff
Barr H. Petersen. He responded to a call to an accident and found both the vehicle of Mrs. Larsen and
the Breitling Brothers dump truck in the vicinity of
the intersection. Deputy Petersen determined the
probable point of impact as being approximately 50
feet back of the South edge of the intersection. He
determined this point to be approximately 26. 7 feet
from the East edge of the roadway and approximately
9 feet 9 inches to the center line. The Southbound lane
of travel was approximaely 16 feet in width. The
point of impact was determined by a slight scuff
mark evidently made by the left front tire of the
dump truck. There were no skid marks by either vehicle to the point of impact. (R. 245-246). At impact
the dump truck would have been toward the right
hand edge of the roadway and the Comet automobile
driven by plaintiff would have been toward the center
of the roadway. The investigating officer had a conversation with each party at the scene of the accident.
We quote from the Record at Page 248:
"Driver No. 1 (dump truck driver) states
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he saw No. 2 ; (Larsen) she appeared to be
pulling to the right to let him pass; then, came
back into the center, and her brake lights came
on. He applied brakes, but was unable to avoid
the collision."
"Driver No. 2 (Larsen) states she signalled for her left-turn - for her turn - was,
then, hit from the rear by No. 1. No. 2 states
she was a little ways from the center, as the
road she was going to turn on is quite narrow.
Let's see - No. 2 states she is familiar with
the area; however, she didn't know the name of
the streets."
The dump truck belonging to the defendant and
respondent, Breitling Brothers, was operated by one
Brent Rulon Dickey. At the time of this accident Mr.
Dickey was employed by the defendant during the
day and was working afternoons gassing cars for
Salt Lake City. He was also a student at the University of Utah during the regular school year. ( R. 262275-276).
The truck involved was a 1959 Reo dump (R.
262) that weighed a proximately 18,000 pounds unloaded. (It was unloaded at the time of the accident).
The truck was equipped with air brakes (R. 265) but
the air brakes were not sufficient to lock the wheels
on full aplication. ( R. 266).
As Mr. Dickey made a left turn following behind the Larsen vehicle, he estimated that the maximum speed that he attained was between 20 and 25
miles per hour and that he continuously maintained
5

a distance between his dump truck and the Larsen
vehicle of at least 60 feet. ( R. 266).
AsMr. Dickey proceeded behind the Larsen car
as both vehicles approached the intersection, he noticed the brake lights of the Larsen vehicle come on
and then he made application of the brakes on the
truck and stated that if he had had a couple of more
feet his truck would have been stopped and there
would have been no collision. ( R. 273).
He also testified that as he proceeded behind the
Larsen car it appeared to move over toward the right
hand side of the lane of travel but that it did not slow
down or speed up, but just continued to move in that
position and he, consequently, had carefully watched
the Larsen vehicle and kept his vehicle at such a distance that he could have avoided a collision no matter what the Larsen vehicle did. ( R. 279).
Mr. David T. Hill testified for the plaintiff. His
experience showed that he was an expert in the field
of dump trucks and their braking systems. ( R. 286288). Mr. Hill testified concerning the mechanics
of an air brakes system on a dump truck such as was
involved in this accident and rendered the opinion
that the brakes would be inadequate or faulty if they
were incapable of locking the wheels and skidding
the tires, particularly with an unloaded truck such
as this.
Mrs. Marlene Orr was westbound in a motor
vehicle and stopped in response to the stop sign at the
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intersection in question. She looked to her right and
observed the small car operated by the appellant and
the dump truck aproaching the intersection from the
North. She stated that she observed them only for a
few seconds and observed that both appeared to be
in the center of their lane and they were proceeding
quite slowly. She observed the vehicle of appellant
lurch several times and then it appeared to stop. At
that point it was struck by the dump truck. She did
not, however, recall that the appellant's vehicle was
stopped at the time of the impact. She thought perhaps she was moving very slowly. (R. 308).
Mrs. Robert L. Breitling testified on behalf of
the respondent corporation. Mr. Breitling testified
as to the type an kind of truck involved and its condition. He indicated that his company maintained a
service department and that the trucks were serviced
if problems developed. This particular truck was a
ten ( 10) wheel Reo dump truck equipped with air
brakes to all wheels. He indicated that air brakes respond slightly slower than hydraulic brakes but that
air brakes are safer brakes because they apply more
pressure.
He testified that it was possible to skid the
wheels of a truck such as this and that the truck
would skid more readily at high speeds than at slower
speeds. He clarified this by stating that a truck would
be expected to stop rather than skid at slow speeds.
He testified on examination that if an air brake
7

system were functioning properly that the wheels on
the truck would either stop or lock and skid when the
brakes were fully applied (R. 319), and, although he
was somewhat equivocal he did admit that if the braking system would not lock the wheels on the truck
then the brakes would be defective. (R. 319).
ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
AW ARD TO PLAINTIFF A DIRECTED VERDICT.

At the conclusion of all the evidence the plaintiff
moved for a directed verdict. ( R.323) . The Motion
was denied and all issues were submitted to the jury.
A verdict in favor of the defendant resulted.
The position of the plaintiff in this case is that
the sole proximate cause of the accident and the injuries to plaintiff was the negligence of the defendant in either ( 1) following the vehicle of plaintiff
too closely, and (2) failing to have an adequate brake
system on the dump truck.
The testimony relied upon by plaintiff to support this proposition follows:
Brent Dickey:
Q. MR. GARRETT: "Do you have the question? Let me state it again: Was the braking system on that truck sufficient or adequate enough to lock the wheels? In other
words, wheels that were attached to the
brakes, was it adequate to lock those
wheels a full application of the brake?
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A.

I have never been around the truck that
air brakes would do this with the weight
of the truck, so it would not skid.
Q. It would not. Now, you had driven this
truck for a long period of time?
A. This particular truck?
Q. Yes.
A. Since June.
Q. You were, then, familiar with its braking
system?
A. Yes.
Q. Very well. And had you had occasion to
make full aplication of the brake on this
truck?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And it wasn't sufficient to lock the
wheels; is that correct?
A. No, sir." (R. 265-266).
Additionally he testified that he was following
the car of the plaintiff at a distance of at least 60 feet
and traveling between 20 and 25 miles an hour. (R.
265-266).
David T. Hill:

Q.

"Now, based upon your experience in the
business - a knowledge of this subjectdo you have an opinion as to whether or
not a truck, where the wheels would not
lock on application - full application of
air - do you have an opinion as to whether or not that truck would have an ade9

quate brake system, or whether or not it
would be a faulty brake system?
A. No.
Q. Do you have such an opinion?
A. Yes.
Q. \Vhat is your opinion?
A. My opinion is that the brake system, there
was something wrong with it,at the time,
for this reason; if you apply the air
brake, fully, you can t h r o w yourself
through the windshield, practically ; you
can lock all wheels up. This is the object
- especially, with a loaded truck.
What I mean, empty truck, if you have
got a loaded truck, it takes a little more
pressure than that, depending on the angle, or if you are on level ground, or what
doing. But, an empty truck, you definitely
could lock all wheels, if this system were
correct, and they would lock right up
solid." (R. 288)
Robert Breitling:
Q. ''''Now, assuming as - assuming as a fact
of this case, that, when Brent Dickey applied the brakes to this truck, and his
wheels did not l'ock, that would be considered a defect in the brake system,
wouldn't it?
A. No; depending what time you are talking
about; I mean, got to give sufficient time
to lock. I would say, if they didn't lock, at
all - of course, if didn't stop, at all - the
brake would be defective; but have to give
sufficient time." (R. 319)
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These facts came from Mr. Breitling, a principal
of the defendant corporation, the driver of the vehicle of defendant and the expert called by the plaintiff. Mr. Hill, plaintiff's expert, and Mr. Breitling
agree that when the air is fully applied to the brakes
on a vehicle such as this, that the wheels will stop or
lock and skid, depending upon the speed of the vehicle. This certainly is a matter of knowledge common to all of us. The driver of the dump truck disagrees. He states that the air on this truck was not
sufficient to lock the wheels.
When the testimony of those most familiar with
this truck and trucks in this category is fully considered, it is quite clear that the brakes on the truck
were inadequate and it is difficult to conceive how
anyone would permit a machine as potentially lethal
as this one, to be on the road in such condition. We
know as a matter of common knowledge that air
brake system on trucks are designed to lock and skid
the wheels. As drivers we observe these rubber marks
on the highway frequently. They are produced by
the locked and skidding wheels of a truck.
We conclude this matter of negligence by reference to the Utah State Statute of the subject: 41-6144 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part:
(6) The brake shoes opera ting within or upon

the drums on the vehicle wheels of any
motor (vehicle) may be used for both service and hand operation.
(b) Performance Ability of Brakes. Every
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motor vehicle or combination of vehicles,
at any (all) times and under all conditions of loading, upon applica:tion of the
service (foot) brake, shall be capable of
( 1) developing a braking force that is not
less than the percentage of its gross
weight tabulated herein for its classification, ( 2) decelerating to a stop from not
more than twenty miles per hour at not
less than the feet per second tabulated
herein for its classification, and ( 3) stopping from a speed of twenty miles per
hour in not more than the distance tabulated herein for the classification, such
distance to be measured from the point at
which movement of the service brake
pedal or control begins. Tests for deceleration and stopping distance shall be made
on a substantially level (not to exceed plus
or min us one per cent grade) , dry,
smooth, hard surf ace that is free from
loose materials .
. . . Stopping distance in feet of single
units of an actual gross weight of 10,000
pounds or more, 40 feet.
The vehicle driver testified that he was traveling at least 60 feet behind appellant's vehicle at 20
to 25 miles an hour and yet he was unable to stop.
The speed in this case is substantially equivalent to
the statutory norm and it will be recalled that the accident occurred on a flat, level roadway.
Appellant believes that it is patently clear that
the defendant was negligent and that such negligence
proximately caused the accident in question, and,
12

hence, the point will not be labored. The more important consideration at this point is whether the appellant was guilty of any negligence and, if so, was such
negligence a proximate contributing cause of the accident. Testimony as to what the appellant was doing up to the point of accident came from appellant,
her passenger, the truck driver and the witness. The
testimony conflicts in some points. The appellant testified that she was driving down the road at a moderate speed and was slowing down preparatory to making a left turn when she was struck in the rear. This
evidence is corroborated by her passenger.
The truck driver stated that as they were proceeding South on the roadway in question, the appellant's vehicle had moved to the right of the lane and
then as they aproached the intersection, she pulled to
the center of the lane and appeared to be suddenly
stopping. The witness testified that she saw both vehicles moving down the road very slowly, was not
aware of any movement from one part of the lane to
the other, but did testify that the movements of the
appellant's car were somewhat jerky as if the car
were a standard transmission and the clutch were
engaged and disengaged too rapidly.
The truck driver did testify that the vehicle
ahead of him appeared to be making a sudden stop. He
admitted, however, that as soon as he saw her brake
lights, he put his brakes on.
(R. 273)
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"Only indication I ever saw was, the brake
lights were on.
Q. You saw them come on?
A. That is when I hit my brakes."
Appellant is mindful of the Rule that if a vehicle
makes a sudden stop or suddenly decreases its speed
in normal traffic movement, that that would be negligence, and if it were a proximate cause of the accident, the preceding driver could not recover. However, the important issue on this Appeal is the matter
of causation.
At the trial appellant established beyond any
question that the braking system on the truck was
deficient. The brakes would not stop the truck in the
distance allowed by the Law of the State of Utah.
That was the sole efficient cause of this accident and
that conclusion is inescapable when the testimony of
the truck driver is reviewed.
At Page 278 and 279 of the Record, the driver
states that he was super-alert to the vehicle ahead of
him and that he was maintaining a sufficient distance between the two vehicles that he could have
avoided anything that the driver ahead did. And, at
Page 273 of the Record he states that had he had a
couple of more feet there would have been no accident.
This testimony clinches the proposition that the sole
cause of this accident was the negligence of the defendant in not being able to control the truck and stop it
in the distance required by Law.
14

Appellant recognizes the oft repeated phrase in
automobile cases that negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause, are matters for a jury.
(Certainly the respondent will dwell on that proposition in its Brief). Certain cases, and this is one, require a higher degree of judicial discernment. Appellant could not find too many cases analogous to
the factual situation involved here but those Courts
that have had such a situation, rule that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence
of the following driver.
In the case of Kent vs. Freeman, 345 South West
2nd 252 (Tenn.), the Court states the following:
"There is no contention whatsoever that
there was any negligence on the part of Mr.
Kent except his alleged failure to give· a signal
of his intention to turn right into Douglas
Lane. The evidence is without dispute that he
did turn on his blinker signal. The only point
of dispute is as to whether or not this blinker
signal worked so as to be visible to the driver
of the truck.
"As we have seen hereinabove, defendant
Harrison saw this car in front of him all the
way from the time he came over a small hill
some 3/lO's of a mile away and continued to
have it in plain view all the time, hence, it
would appear that the sole proximate cause of
this accident was the negligence of the driver
of the truck in failing to keep his vehicle under
proper control, and the negligence of the driver
and owner thereof, in operating an overloaded
truck which could not be stopped in the space
and time prudence required."
15

The case of Forenian vs. American Auto Insurance Company, 137 South 2d, 728 (La.) concerned
a front to rear collision between two trucks. The evidence pointed to the fact that the lead truck made a
sudden stop and the following truck had defective
brakes.
After discussing the conflicting testimony concerning the above matters, the Court stated:
"Regardless of the distance which was required for Morgan to bring his truck to a stop
after his brakes were applied, however, it
seems to us that if the brakes on the following
truck had been functioning properly, Whiteheadwould have been able to stop his truck
within aproximately the same distance, since
both trucks were the same type and were carrying identical loads."
Whitehead testified that:
I first hit my brakes, I was traveling approximately 30 or 40 yards behind him."
''Whitehead, therefore, had 90 to 120 feet,
plus the remaining distance traversed by Morgan before his truck stopped, within which to
stop after his brakes had been applied, and we
have already concluded that Morgan's stop
was not as abrupt as contended by the plaintiff and intervenor. We are convinced that the
accident would not have occurred if the brakes
on the Whitehead truck had been functioning.
Since Whitehead, with proper 1y working
brakes had ample time within which to stop
his truck before the accident occurred, we
think any negligence which may be attributed
16

to Morgan for bringing his truck to a stop suddenly cannot be construed as constituting a
proximate or contributing cause of the accident."
Appellant seeks a reversal of this case on the
reasoning set forth in the Foreman case, supra.
Where, as here, the truck driver could have stopped
his vehicle in time to have avoided the collision had
the truck been equipped with adequate brakes, then,
even if we accept respondents theory of sudden stop,
such stop could not be a proximate cause of the accident.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

Instruction No. 13 given by the Trial Court is
the "sudden peril doctrine" (R. 119) and is verbatim
JIFU Instruction No. 15.4. Appellant duly excepted
the giving of this Instruction on the grounds that it
was inappropriate under the facts of this case. The
truck driver was not suddenly confronted with any
peril or emergency - he had followed the vehicle of
Mrs. Larsen for a considerable distance and was
super-alert to that vehicle and was following at such
a distance, according to his own testimony, that he
could have avoided her vehicle no matter what she
had done.
The driver simply applied his brakes in response
to the application of brakes from the car ahead of
him and were it not for the fact that his brakes were
17

not adequate, the accident would not have occurred.
This is not a situation of sudden peril where alternative choices might have been taken. There was no imminent threat to the truck driver because he obviously thought he could avoid the collision.
Compare the Utah case of Howard vs. Ringsby
Truck Lines, 2 Utah 2d, 65, 269 Pac. 2d, 295, where
the doctrine is discussed and applied.
In the case of Gittens vs. Limdberg, 3 Utah 2d,
392, 284 Pac. 2d, 1115, the Court stated:
"The plaintiff also complains of the trial
courts refusal to give a requested instruction
on a sudden emergency. It is our opinion that
no error was committed. The request did not
properly state the Law because it did not cover
the requisite element that the emergency must
be one which arose without fault on the part
of plaintiff. Where the plaintiff creates the
peril by his own fault, he may not thereafter
urge the sudden emergency doctrine to protect
himself from the charge of contributory negligence. It was defendant's theory and his evidence showed, that the plaintiff ran in front
of defendant's vehicle when the latter was too
close to avoid striking him. Under plaintiff's
own testimony he admitted observing the car
from the Nor th no less than three times before
he entered the intersection."
The defendant created the peril in this case by
putting a truck on the road with defective brakes.
When the defendant created this peril it should not
expect to profit from the doctrine.
18

Appellant excepted to the Courts Instructions No.
18, 19 and 22 (R. 124, 125 and 128). These Instructions read as follows:
Instruction No. 18:
Under the laws of Utah no person shall
turn a vehicle unless the vehicle is in a proper
position upon the roadway so that the turn or
movement can be made with reasonable safety.
Under no circumstance shall any person
turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal either by the hand or arm or a turn
signal lamp indicator.
Before a turn is made a signal of intention to turn either right or left shall be given
continuously during the last 100 feet traveled
by the vehicle prior to the start of the turn.
Instruction No. 19:
The law requires that no person shall turn
a vehicle upon a public highway unless such
movement can be made with reasonable safety.
This does not mean, however, that the driver
of a motor vehicle, before making a turn, must
know there is no possibility of an accident. It
means that before starting to turn a vehicle and
while making a turn, the driver of the vehicle
must use such precaution as would satisfy a
reasonable and prudent person acting under
similar circumstances that the turn could be
made safely.
Instruction No. 22 :
It was the duty of Zona Larsen to use reasonable care under the circumstances in driving her vehicle to avoid danger to herself and
19

others and to observe and be aware of the conditions of the highway, the traffic thereon, and
other existing conditions; in that regard, it
was her duty to observe due care in each of the
fallowing particulars:
(a) To exercise reasonable care to keep a lookout for other vehicles ahead and behind
her and other conditions reasonably to be
anticipated.
(b) To keep her car under reasonable, safe

and proper control.

(c) Not to suddenly stop or decrease her speed
without first ascertaining that she could
do so with reasonable safety and, if other
vehicles would be affected by such movement, not without first giving an appropriate signal to the driver to the rear by
the extension of the hand and arm downward if there was a reasonable opportunity to give such signal that such movement
is to be made.
(d) To not turn her vehicle upon the highway

from a direct course or move right or left
upon the roadway if other vehicles would
be affected by such movement, until and
unless such movement could be made with
reasonable safety.

(e) To approach the intersection where she
in tended to turn left in the extreme lefthand lane lawfully available to traffic to
begin her left turn.

(f) To give signal of intention to turn left
continuously not less than the last 100
feet traveled by the vehicle before turn20

ing, if other vehicles would be affected by
such movement.
These Instructions set forth among other things
the legal theories of turning automobiles. (It will be
recalled that the independent witness called by the
defendant did not testify to any turning movement
on the part of the vehicle of appellant.) The only evidence in the case as to the turn came from the truck
driver who stated the vehicle of appellant moved
from the outside of the lane to the center of the lane
directly in front of him and was slowing down, converging to a stop.
The appellant testified that she was approaching the intersection preparing to turn left. However,
the left turn law could not possibly enter into this case
because the accident had happened before the appellant ever reached the intersection.
Furthermore, the legal statement concerning
turning automobiles is not relevant to the issues. The
fact is that the roadway in question was a two lane
road; that the truck was a minimum of 60 feet behind
the Larsen vehicle and if in fact, she did move within
the confines of her own lane of travel, certainly the
truck wa s unaffected and appellant had a legal right
to move in her own lane of travel. Under the foregoing Instructions however, the jury could easily have
been confused and could have found that she had no
right to move in her lane of travel; had violated the
left turn law; and, therefore, had no right to recover
21

in this action. The Instructions are clearly prejudicial.
Appellant excepted to the Courts Instruction
No. 23 ( R. 129). The Instruction reads:
"You are instructed that as a matter of
law a brake light signal which is given simultaneously with a sudden stop or decrease of
speed of an automobile without more is not in
compliance with the duty to give an appropriate signal, and any such signal, if any was given, without more, would not be an appropriate
signal of suddenly stopping or decreasing
speed. If you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff, Zona Larsen, suddenly stopped or decreased the speed of her
vehicle and that the only signal she gave was
a brake light signal simultaneously with the
sudden stop or decrease of speed, then you are
instructed that such signal, if any, would not
be an appropriate signal and that such action
on her part would be negligence."
The Instruction is deceptive. It states that as a
matter of law a brake light signal is not sufficient
when coupled with a sudden stop or decrease in speed
and that the appellant would be negligent if she did
so.
The truck driver was not surprised. He was
super-alert to the movement of the plaintiff's car and
applied his brakes immediately upon seeing her brake
light. Certainly the appellant could not be guilty of
negligence as a matter of law as this Instruction implies under those facts. To be a complete statement of
22

the Law, the Instruction should have contained a
statement in substance that such actions would not
be negligent unless such actions unreasonably interferred with the following traffic.
Appellant duly excepted the Courts Instruction
No. 24 ( R. 130 and 131). This Instruction reads:
Even if you find the two propositions in
the foregoing Instruction in favor of the plaintiff Zona Larsen, she, nevertheless may be barred from recovery by contributory negligence.
Before contributory negligence would
preclude a recovery by said Zona Larsen you
must find from a preponderance of the evidence that each of the following propositions
are true:
Proposition No. 1 :
That the said plaintiff Zona Larsen was
negligent in the operation of the Larsen automobile just before the impact in one or more
of the following particulars:
(a) In failing to exercise reasonable care to
keep a lookout for other vehicles ahead
and behind her and other conditions reasonably to be anticipated; or,
(b) In failing to keep her vehicle under reasonable safe and proper control, or
( c) In suddenly stopping or decreasing her
speed without first ascertaining she could
do so with reasonable safety and, if other
vehicles would be affected by such movement, without first giving an appropriate
signal to the driver to the rear by the ex23

tension of the hand and arm downward
if there was reasonable opportunity to do
so, or
( d) In turning her vehicle upon the highway
from a direct course or moving right or
left upon the roadway if other vehicles
would be affected by such movement at
a time when such movement could not be
made with reasonable safety, or
( e) In failing to approach the intersection in
the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic to begin her left turn, or
(f) In failing to give a signal of her intention
to turn left continuously for at least the
last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before
turning if other vehicles would be affected by such movement.
Proposition No. 2:
That the said negligence of the plaintiff,
Zona Larsen, if any, was a proximate and contributing cause of the occurrence. If you find
those two propositions against the plaintiff,
Zona Larsen, she cannot recover even though
you found in favor of the plaintiff, Zona Larsen, and against the defendant on the issue
stated in the fore going Instruction.
The Instruction starts out by stating that:
''Even if you find the two propositions in
the fore going Instruction in favor of the plaintiff, Zona Larsen, she, nevertheless may be
barred from recovery by contributory negligence." (R. 130)
The foregoing Instruction is No. 23 and as quot24

ed above in this Brief that Instruction does not contain two propositions. It treats the subject of signal
by brake light and bears no relationship to Instruction No. 24.
The Instruction concludes by stating:
"If you find those two p r o p o s i t i o n s
against the plaintiff, Zona Larsen, she cannot
recover even though you found in favor of the
plaintiff, Zona Larsen, and against the defendant on the issue stated in the foregoing Instruction."
The net effect of this Instruction is to hopelessly
confuse the jury.

Furthermore, when we compare Instruction No.
24 with Instruction No. 22 we see that the Court is
stating the same propositions in a slightly different
manner. In Instruction No. 22 the duty of the plaintiff is set forth and in Instruction No. 24 it is stated
in substance that she would be guilty of contributory
negligence if she viofated those duties. Instruction
No. 22 puts issues before the jury on the matter of
turning that were not relevant to the facts of the case,
and Instruction No. 24 compounds the error by reemphasizing those matters. In addition, the jury is
directed to the foregoing Instruction which does not
contain two propositions although this Instruction
states that it does, and then concludes by indicating
that plaintiff cannot recover if the two above issues
are found against her even though they found in her
favor on the issue stated in the foregoing Instruction.
25

A lay juror could only approach this case with
bewilderment in view of these Instructions and the
resultin·g confusion deprived the appellant of a fair
trial.
CONCLUSION
1. That the Lower Court erred in not granting
appellant a direct verdict on the issue of liability,
and,
2. That the jury Instructions of the Court were
erroneous and prejudicial.
As to No. 1 above, the evidence clearly shows
that the brakes on the dump truck were defective and
would not lock the wheels. The truck driver testified
that he was sufficiently far from the vehicle of appellant that he could have avoided her no matter what
she did and that had he had a few more feet there
would have been no impact. It is apparent from this
testimony that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the defendant in putting a
vehicle such as this (po ten ti ally dangerous in the best
condition and lethal with defective brakes) on the
roadways of this community.
As to No. 2, appellant has detailed in this Brief,
those portions of the Court's Instructions deemed to
be erroneous and prejudicial. The Court injected issues before the jury that were not warranted by the
facts such as the law regarding a turning vehicle, and
the Instructions cited above and considered as a
26

whole, are confusing, erroneous and deprived the appellant of a fair trial.
This case should be reversed and the District
Court ordered to enter a directed verdict on the issue
of liabiilty for the plaintiff. Alternately appellant
requests a new trial on all issues.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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